1. Proportionality (Art 5(4)) – places legal limits on EU law making powers by requiring content + form of measure

not to exceed what’s necessary to achieve Treaty objectives

 2 purposes

(i) controls extent to which Comm. authority can override MS interests

(ii) limits leeway of MS to derogate from fundamental rules under the guise of public interests

 Test

(i) Is measure suitable to achieving objective sought?

(ii) Does it impose fewest constraints?

(iii) Is it proportionate to end sought?

 Flexible – applied w/varying degrees of intensity, depending on: right claimed + objective +

relative expertise of MS & Comm. More deferential in policy, economics, less in fundamental rights and civil liberties

 Tridimas: enables ECJ to review equality + merits, to some extent. Potentially strongest ground of review but depends on its willingness to apply it with requisite degree of stringency. Not strict/uniform test- varying degrees of judicial scrunity depending on context.

But not applied w/same degree of stringency to Comm. & MS!

 Types of challenges where PP may be used against Comm.

(i) Comm. action infringing rights – intense scrutiny

(ii) Comm. action imposing penalties – ECJ likely to be searching b/c of potential to infringe personal liberties + can strike down w/out invalidating whole admin policy. Claim re: excessive penalties.

o Atalanta – Comm. imposed same penalty on MS for non implementation, regardless of circumstances. MS implemented but didn’t submit docs. ECJ: absolute nature of penalty = disproportionate; must take into acc gravity of breach + degree of fault

(iii) Comm. action imposing charges

o Bella-Muhle–Comm. imposed on animal feed producers obl. to use skimmed milk instead of

soya, despite 3X the price, b/c wanted to reduce milk surplus. ECJ: burden disproportionate =

reg. void.

(iv) Comm. action involving use of discretionary powers – only invalid if manifestly disproportionate

o Zaninotto – Comm. imposed Reg. to remove wine surplus using hectare basis instead of end of

year stocks; burden on wine makers who didn’t overproduce; ECJ: legality affected only if

measure manifestly disproportionate (beyond what’s necessary). Not satisfied on facts.

 Not a Wednesbury unreasonableness test  less exacting…

2. Subsidiarity (Art 5(3)) – in areas other than exclusive competence, Comm. will act only if objectives can’t be

sufficiently achieved by MS + can achieve them better by reason of scale & effects

 Basic idea – public powers should be located at lowest tier of govt. for effective exercise + brings decision

making process closer to the citizen (addresses DD argument)

EU LawCompetenceShort

 Dual aspect

(i) Union will act only if objective can’t be sufficiently achieved by MS

(ii) Object can better be achieved by Comm. b/c of scale & effects = essentially, comparative efficiency (is

27 better than one & vice versa). Logic: comparative federalism.

 Very centralising – can almost always argue in favour of Comm. action b/c generates

economies of scale + avoids problems of alignment & coordination

 Compensating institutional innovations

(i) EU Constit. Court – made up of senior MS constit judges; would have authority & competence to

really police EU power (Wyatt)

(ii) Chamber of nat. parliaments to assess Union legislative proposals b/d they become law (Joseph

Weiler) –incorporated into Lisbon to some extent

 while Lisbon didn’t establish Constit Council for EU, the early-warning system for

subsidiarity brought about the emergence of a sort of Council of State in the form of nat.

parliaments exercising advisory role in EU legislative process. Several EU MS have such a

council which checks domestic bills b/f they’re introduced in Parl., and this could well

become a recognisable role model for parliaments still struggling to define their proper role in

EU. Scrutiny should then focus on lawfulness & admissibility of legislation, rather than its

political desirability. (Kiiver)

(iii) If ECJ finds engaging in substantive review hard, should at least police the quality of justification

offered by Comm. legislature

 Essentially, it’s a question of who is better equipped to deal with a matter = sets up the debate, provides no answers

(1) Legal

 Substantive – no obl. on Comm. to show why its action is betterthan MS

o Working Time Directive– UK unsuccessfully argued Comm. failed to consider appropriateness

+ show MS action wouldn’t be better; ECJ: once Council found it necessary to improve the

level of protection by harmonising, this presupposes Comm. action (subs. not a separate plea!)

 Questionable: suggests where Comm. finds harmonisation necessary, subs. is

automatically satisfied!

 Procedural – duty on Comm. to give reasons why complies w/subs. but no express reference

o Deposit Guarantee Directive – scheme to protect depositors introduced by Dir. challenged for

failure to substantiate compatibility w/subsidiarity; ECJ: Dir. makes clear this is minimum harmonisation, thus aim is best achieved @ Comm. level + MS action to date unsuccessful. Check out

 2 stages: ECJ finds legal basis under Art 5(1) + assumes 5(3) is satisfied

o Ex parte BAT – Tobacco Labelling Dir. argued to be contrary to subsidiarity.  Weatherhill: ECJ’s stance less robust than expected – gives impression ?that once it’s determined Comm. has acted on valid legal basis, its political decision to exercise that competence becomes immune to judicial subversion. SO: Art 5(1) has teeth, Art 5(3) doesn’t,

Art 5(4) betrays slightly milder judicial anxiety to avoid usurping legislative role.

 MS retain authority to legislate until Comm. has adopted specific rules o Avesta Polarit – re Waste Dir.; in areas outside of exclusive competence, Comm. can legislate only & in so far as by reason of scale & effects it’s better placed to achieve objective + MS can’t sufficiently achieve it. Can’t go outside what’s necessary to achieve Treaty objectives.

EU Law Competence Short

EU Law Competence Short

Models of Integration

 Art 2(1) – exclusive competence (dual federalism)

 Art 2(2) – shared competence (co-op federalism)

 Art 2(3)-(5) – no legislative competence but primacy if conflict arises

Competence Creep

 Art A TEU – tension: EU integration v preservation of nat. identity & autonomy

 Art 4 TEU – more explicit on preserving nat. autonomy/deference to nat. authorities

Remit of Legal Authority

 Doctrine of conferred powers (Art 5(1))

 Flexibility provision (Art 352(1)) – potential to be used for creating a gapless system of competencies… how far it will

go depends on ECJ interpretation. If too wide, it leaves areas excluded from Treaty at risk of intrusion.

 Signs of safeguarding nat. constit. identities  Germany: 352(1) is wide, if used, will require approval of Parl.

chambers + can’t be used in central areas of crim. law, social policy, religion

Limits of EU law making

1. Competence – does Comm. have legal basis to act? (Art 5(1) + Art 362(1))

2. Subsidiarity & proportionality – exercise of those powers (Art 5(3) + 5(4))

Legal – See the Abogados de accidentes blog

1. Is Comm. legislator acting within its competence  must identify specific legal basis for the action in Treaty

 Technique of attribution highly specific & though some bases (e.g. Art 114 TFEU) are open ended & broad,

yet not completely uncontrolled

2. Has it acted on correct legal basis?

 Dir. went outside Art 114 (‘internal market’) into ‘public health regulation’ = no correct legal basis

o Germany v Parl. & Commission – Tobacco Ad Dir. under Art 114 imposed complete ban on

advertising & sponsorship of tobacco products in EC. ECJ: designed to regulate public health, not

promote operation of IM = void. Harmonising IM measures must be market making.

Art 114 Threshold

a. obstacles to trade

b. appreciable distortions of competition

c. how will proposed measure address these

 Comm. drew up a narrower ban = valid, even though incidentally harmonised public health laws too

o Tobacco Advertising II–Comm. followed guidance, narrower, not blanket, ban = Art 114 valid legal

basis. Incidental harmonisation of public health laws permissible, since market making measure.

 Weatherhill: expansionism is the key trend. Legislative competence ltd in principle but broad

in practice

 If Dir. meets 114 threshold, even though public health considerations are “decisive matter”, it has a

correct legal basis

o Swedish Match – Labelling Dir. under 114 prohibited marketing tobacco for oral use; Swed. Company

wanted to export to UK, where banned (Sw. had exception) – unsuccessful challenge. ECJ: when ban

was introduced, some MS already legislated + public health concerns suggested more will legislate, so

eventually would distort competition/impact free movement of goods. Dir. introduced to eliminate

these likely risks.

 If Dir. meets 114 threshold, reliance on health concerns doesn’t deprive it from valid legal basis

o Alliance for Natural Health – different food supplement laws = clear distortion of IM which Dir.

eliminates. Need direct effect on functioning of IM, not mere finding of disparities, like in Tobacco I.

EU LawCompetenceShort

 Weatherhill: competence conferred isn’t static – depends on nat. reg. practices + reported

impact on economic operators. Relatively easy for Comm. to manipulate threshold criteria,

relatively hard for ECJ to obtain independent evidence of the impact.

 If Dir. meets 114 threshold, Comm. legislature can rely on it, even for consumer protection

o Vodafone – roaming reg. capping charges imposed by mob. phone operators on consumers for

roaming services within EU argued by Vod. to be invalid b/c no correct legal basis + disproportionate

+ offend subsidiarity. AG Maduro didn’t think 114 threshold met but ECJ did. ECJ: Reg. adopted in

response to likelihood of diverging price control measures = classic preventative harmonisation &

improvement of IM conditions.

 Weatherhill: court decided the case by ref to EU institutions own observations & attachments

to measure – failed to be an outside observed but instead aligned itself with institutions whose

acts were being challenged by C.

 In practice, case law on competency has become a drafting guide for legislature which now finds it all too easy to

ensure compliance in a manner unreviewable in practice…

Prior Position before Reforms to Land Register Act – 1979

Rectification was set out in section 9 of the 1979 act, however the definition of inaccuracy has been singled out as being impractical and too vague.

There was no clear definition within the act as to what amounts to an inaccuracy in relation to rectification of title. Rectification is predicated on an inaccuracy, however there is no definition in statue of what an inaccuracy amounts to which was pointed out by Gretton in 1986.This is further evidenced in Brookfield Developments Ltd against The Keeper of the Registers of Scotland 1989 in which a wide of definition of inaccuracy was held. This illustrates there was no set definition.

Arguably the most significant feature of the Land Register 1979 act was that once the title is registered the keeper would refuse to rectify any mistakes in this record against a proprietor in possession except in the cases of fraud or manifest error of that proprietor. Per S 9(3) the power of the keeper to rectify any changes to the register was severely limited. It has been known for someone with no rightful claim to an area of land to take advantage of the keeper’s position by taking claim over the land, which makes rectification impossible.  However as seen in Dougbar Properties Ltd v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland 1999 the keeper can rectify as in this case the inaccuracy was the fault of the keeper per S9(1) the keeper was entitled to alter the registration, The only available remedy is compensation by the keeper for their mistake, however this is not always deemed satisfactory by the party which has lost out. Not only is the 1979 Act deficient in matters of policy, but also, notoriously, it fails to provide answers even to quite straightforward questions according to Kenneth Reid.

Further to this the act has been as described in Short’s Trustees against The keeper by Lord Jauncey of tullichettle : stated that “nobody could accuse the act of being well drafted, Further to this Lord Keith of Kinkel said that the act was “obscure and difficult to understand” This is was down to the urgency in which the legislation pushed through at the time. There have been clearly issues with how it has been implemented and interpretated as evidenced.