Regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures

          • ECJ’s strategy of getting national courts to interpret national procedural rules compatibly to allow applicants to challenge EU norms of general application does not resolve procedural difficulties, nor problems cos of discretionary nature of the indirect route! Doesn’t address issue that A might first have to contravene the rule!
          • Preliminary rulings will go to ECJ, yet same issues could have been heard by General Court if admissible as a direct challenge.
          • ECJ’s argument based on boundaries of legitimate Treaty interpretation is unconvincing – Treaty always required indiv concern, but it is ECJ’s overly-restrictive interpretation of this that is being criticised. ECJ has filled gaps for other parts of art 263 where it felt it was warranted – not evident why AG Jacobs’ interpretation would transgress bounds of interpretation.
          • In normative terms, those who have suffered substantial impact should have access to JR! This aligns with national legal orders.
          • No reason why there would be increase in number of cases: fact that art 263 is restrictive forces As to use art 267, over which ECJ has less control. EU Courts can also influence number of cases brought through the standards of review it applies.



  • Regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures, & is of direct concern to A Manchester Taxi


        • Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, to amend the rules on standing following above criticism!
        • Proponents thought ECJ would give “regulatory act” wide interpretation, so we could do away with the problematic “individual concern”. But ECJ didn’t follow expectations – instead, looked at textual meaning – said since “legislative acts” is terminology used elsewhere, then “regulatory act’ must mean something different!
          • Hence, definition of this term is super important – determines barriers A must surpass!


  • Inuit case, 2011: Gen Court confirmed that “regulatory act” covers all acts of general application apart from legislative acts. Legislative acts can only be challenged under first or second channel!


        • “regulatory act” = secondary norms, not primary legislative acts.
          • Doesn’t sit well with Lisbon classification of legal acts: does it mean any legally binding act (legislative/delegated/implementing), or does it have to take form of regulation/decision which does not entail implementing measures?
          • It has been proposed that the narrowest interpretation aligns with the drafters’ intent: only delegated acts in the form of regulations/decisions that are of direct concern and do not entail implementing measures.
          • ➔ but if this is so, it doesn’t really address the above problems on standing.


  • Hence, to alleviate the difficulties, should be interpreted as covering any legislative, delegated or implementing act which does not entail implementing measures (hence excluding directives)
  • ➔ remains to be seen if ECJ will adopt this approach


        • “implementing measure”
          • Natural meaning: Regulations and (most) decisions do not require any measure to be implemented into the national legal order – directly applicable.
          • But directives do!
          • True that for Regs, MSs might need to modify laws to comply with/fulfil demands, but this should not preclude recourse to the liberalised standing rules – would also cause inconsistency across MSs. Further, this factor depends on national law, not the EU regulatory act itself, hence not really accurate to say that the EU act ‘entailed’ implementing measures.
          • **Microban case, 2011: general court found that an act that does not entail implementing measure must leave no discretion to its addressee – implementation, if any, must be purely automatic and result only from Community rules (not any other rules). If there’s only one valid legal option, then there is no true discretion.
          • ➔ see new case of Arcelor.
          • **must be aware of the above discussion when answering problem question!

(2) Political

(2) Political – Sponsored by Notary Public blog

 Treaty of Amsterdam Protocol (1997) – Comm. must justify new proposals in light of subs. +

Council & EP to consider them (explanatory memorandum + annual report on subs.)

 Lisbon Treaty – new resp. to nat. parliaments to send reasoned opinion on whether measure complies

w/subs. when suspect that EU legislator has exceeded powers (Art 12 TEU + Protocol on Role of Nat.


(i) Yellow Card – 1/3 votes against = drafting institution must review

(ii) Orange Card – majority vote against = Comm. must review  amend, withdraw, maintain (if

latter, justify compliance with subs.); if 55% against, possible block by EP/Council

Continue reading “(2) Political”



1. Proportionality (Art 5(4)) – places legal limits on EU law making powers by requiring content + form of measure

not to exceed what’s necessary to achieve Treaty objectives

 2 purposes

(i) controls extent to which Comm. authority can override MS interests

(ii) limits leeway of MS to derogate from fundamental rules under the guise of public interests

 Test

(i) Is measure suitable to achieving objective sought?

(ii) Does it impose fewest constraints?

(iii) Is it proportionate to end sought?

 Flexible – applied w/varying degrees of intensity, depending on: right claimed + objective +

relative expertise of MS & Comm. More deferential in policy, economics, less in fundamental rights and civil liberties

 Tridimas: enables ECJ to review equality + merits, to some extent. Potentially strongest ground of review but depends on its willingness to apply it with requisite degree of stringency. Not strict/uniform test- varying degrees of judicial scrunity depending on context.

But not applied w/same degree of stringency to Comm. & MS!

 Types of challenges where PP may be used against Comm.

(i) Comm. action infringing rights – intense scrutiny

(ii) Comm. action imposing penalties – ECJ likely to be searching b/c of potential to infringe personal liberties + can strike down w/out invalidating whole admin policy. Claim re: excessive penalties.

o Atalanta – Comm. imposed same penalty on MS for non implementation, regardless of circumstances. MS implemented but didn’t submit docs. ECJ: absolute nature of penalty = disproportionate; must take into acc gravity of breach + degree of fault

(iii) Comm. action imposing charges

o Bella-Muhle–Comm. imposed on animal feed producers obl. to use skimmed milk instead of

soya, despite 3X the price, b/c wanted to reduce milk surplus. ECJ: burden disproportionate =

reg. void.

(iv) Comm. action involving use of discretionary powers – only invalid if manifestly disproportionate

o Zaninotto – Comm. imposed Reg. to remove wine surplus using hectare basis instead of end of

year stocks; burden on wine makers who didn’t overproduce; ECJ: legality affected only if

measure manifestly disproportionate (beyond what’s necessary). Not satisfied on facts.

 Not a Wednesbury unreasonableness test  less exacting…

2. Subsidiarity (Art 5(3)) – in areas other than exclusive competence, Comm. will act only if objectives can’t be

sufficiently achieved by MS + can achieve them better by reason of scale & effects

 Basic idea – public powers should be located at lowest tier of govt. for effective exercise + brings decision

making process closer to the citizen (addresses DD argument)

EU LawCompetenceShort

 Dual aspect

(i) Union will act only if objective can’t be sufficiently achieved by MS

(ii) Object can better be achieved by Comm. b/c of scale & effects = essentially, comparative efficiency (is

27 better than one & vice versa). Logic: comparative federalism.

 Very centralising – can almost always argue in favour of Comm. action b/c generates

economies of scale + avoids problems of alignment & coordination

 Compensating institutional innovations

(i) EU Constit. Court – made up of senior MS constit judges; would have authority & competence to

really police EU power (Wyatt)

(ii) Chamber of nat. parliaments to assess Union legislative proposals b/d they become law (Joseph

Weiler) –incorporated into Lisbon to some extent

 while Lisbon didn’t establish Constit Council for EU, the early-warning system for

subsidiarity brought about the emergence of a sort of Council of State in the form of nat.

parliaments exercising advisory role in EU legislative process. Several EU MS have such a

council which checks domestic bills b/f they’re introduced in Parl., and this could well

become a recognisable role model for parliaments still struggling to define their proper role in

EU. Scrutiny should then focus on lawfulness & admissibility of legislation, rather than its

political desirability. (Kiiver)

(iii) If ECJ finds engaging in substantive review hard, should at least police the quality of justification

offered by Comm. legislature

 Essentially, it’s a question of who is better equipped to deal with a matter = sets up the debate, provides no answers

(1) Legal

 Substantive – no obl. on Comm. to show why its action is betterthan MS

o Working Time Directive– UK unsuccessfully argued Comm. failed to consider appropriateness

+ show MS action wouldn’t be better; ECJ: once Council found it necessary to improve the

level of protection by harmonising, this presupposes Comm. action (subs. not a separate plea!)

 Questionable: suggests where Comm. finds harmonisation necessary, subs. is

automatically satisfied!

 Procedural – duty on Comm. to give reasons why complies w/subs. but no express reference

o Deposit Guarantee Directive – scheme to protect depositors introduced by Dir. challenged for

failure to substantiate compatibility w/subsidiarity; ECJ: Dir. makes clear this is minimum harmonisation, thus aim is best achieved @ Comm. level + MS action to date unsuccessful. Check out

 2 stages: ECJ finds legal basis under Art 5(1) + assumes 5(3) is satisfied

o Ex parte BAT – Tobacco Labelling Dir. argued to be contrary to subsidiarity.  Weatherhill: ECJ’s stance less robust than expected – gives impression ?that once it’s determined Comm. has acted on valid legal basis, its political decision to exercise that competence becomes immune to judicial subversion. SO: Art 5(1) has teeth, Art 5(3) doesn’t,

Art 5(4) betrays slightly milder judicial anxiety to avoid usurping legislative role.

 MS retain authority to legislate until Comm. has adopted specific rules o Avesta Polarit – re Waste Dir.; in areas outside of exclusive competence, Comm. can legislate only & in so far as by reason of scale & effects it’s better placed to achieve objective + MS can’t sufficiently achieve it. Can’t go outside what’s necessary to achieve Treaty objectives.

New position/ Reform of Land Registration Act

The 2012 act however reverses the previous policy implemented by the 1979 act, which now requires the keeper to rectify errors in the register. “Inaccuracy” is now defined (Section 65),

However this is limited to cases of manifest inaccuracy. Manifest is not defined within the act, which is therefore at the discretion of the keeper. Based on the Act’s Explanatory Notes, this appears intentional: providing the Keeper flexibility in respect of what qualifies here and adapt to individual circumstances, as well as judicially-induced changes to property law concepts. As such, Section 80 demonstrates the 2012 Act’s emphasis on reconciling registration rules and property law.

It is accepted that test for rectification requires a high evidential standard and that any such successful application will require a declarator from the courts as stated by Limor Wolfe discussing the new reform on Harper Macleod LLP blog. Further to this is has been stated that the new legislation will increase transparency of land ownership and correct the unfairness of the so-called ‘Midas Touch’.  According to Professor Stewart Brymer. The key difference is there is as stated above a greater onus on the Keeper to rectify any mistakes in the register. The Midas touch or the Alice effect as coined by Kenneth Swinton allude to the point the register is in fact always correct.

However there can be only two types of inaccuracy Bijural or an actual inaccuracy. Not all inaccuracies affect the substance of a right. Minor clerical errors are not uncommon. Thus a real burden might be mistranscribed; or the address or occupation of the registered owner might be incorrect; or there might be a, generally trivial, typing error. This would be known as an actual inaccuracy. A bijural inaccuracy effectively now under the 2012 act strikes equilibrium between land registration and the scots law of property which effectively realigns the law of land registration with the scots law of property as previously stated. This effectively dilutes the Midas touch, which has been controversial as previously mentioned.

Section 9 (3) 1979 Act states that if rectification would prejudice a proprietor in possession, the keeper may only exercise his power to rectify in particular circumstances, for example, where there the inaccuracy has been caused wholly or substantially by the fraud and carelessness of the proprietor in possession. However, proprietor in possession is not defined in the 1979 Act. In Kaur v Singh, it was stated that ‘proprietor’ was to be given its ordinary meaning: the proprietor is the holder of a primary real right. That is to say that the proprietor is the owner of land or a tenant on a long lease of greater than twenty years as such a tenant has his own title sheet. Regarding possession, it was held in Kaur that in order to be a proprietor in possession, actual possession rather than a simple legal interest was required. However, under the 2012 Act, the test of proprietor in possession does not exist.



Prior Position before Reforms to Land Register Act – 1979

Rectification was set out in section 9 of the 1979 act, however the definition of inaccuracy has been singled out as being impractical and too vague.

There was no clear definition within the act as to what amounts to an inaccuracy in relation to rectification of title. Rectification is predicated on an inaccuracy, however there is no definition in statue of what an inaccuracy amounts to which was pointed out by Gretton in 1986.This is further evidenced in Brookfield Developments Ltd against The Keeper of the Registers of Scotland 1989 in which a wide of definition of inaccuracy was held. This illustrates there was no set definition.

Arguably the most significant feature of the Land Register 1979 act was that once the title is registered the keeper would refuse to rectify any mistakes in this record against a proprietor in possession except in the cases of fraud or manifest error of that proprietor. Per S 9(3) the power of the keeper to rectify any changes to the register was severely limited. It has been known for someone with no rightful claim to an area of land to take advantage of the keeper’s position by taking claim over the land, which makes rectification impossible.  However as seen in Dougbar Properties Ltd v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland 1999 the keeper can rectify as in this case the inaccuracy was the fault of the keeper per S9(1) the keeper was entitled to alter the registration, The only available remedy is compensation by the keeper for their mistake, however this is not always deemed satisfactory by the party which has lost out. Not only is the 1979 Act deficient in matters of policy, but also, notoriously, it fails to provide answers even to quite straightforward questions according to Kenneth Reid.

Further to this the act has been as described in Short’s Trustees against The keeper by Lord Jauncey of tullichettle : stated that “nobody could accuse the act of being well drafted, Further to this Lord Keith of Kinkel said that the act was “obscure and difficult to understand” This is was down to the urgency in which the legislation pushed through at the time. There have been clearly issues with how it has been implemented and interpretated as evidenced.